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DISCUSSION 
SCHLICK'S RESPONSIBLE MAN 
In his Problems of Ethics, Moritz Schlick confidently dissolved 
the free will pseudoproblem, a celebrated dissolution widely consid- 
ered conclusive, at least until linguistic  analyses of  "can," "could 
have done otherwise," etc., reopened the issue. Even in the current 
debate Schlick  remains influential, and his account of  responsibility 
is perennially reprinted as  exemplary  soft  determinism.* But  we 
shall here show that this modern classic is incoherent. 
"When is a man responsible?" Schlick  answers  from  the view- 
point first of "objective judgment" and secondly  of  "subjective feeling，. 
(A) Responsibility objectively defined. A person is responsible 
when he offers a "unified point for the application of mo- 
tive." Knowing who is responsible "is a matter only of know- 
ing who is to be punished or rewarded, in order that punish- 
ment and reward function as such—be able to achieve their 
goal." Let us express Schlick's objective analysis: 
(a) Def. obj.: A is responsible in doing x = 
Threat  of  punishment  will cause A not to do x,  
or 
promise of reward will cause A to do x. 
"Morally" tacitly prefixes "responsible." Where x is an undesirable 
act, the penal disjunct ordinarily will operate;  where x is desirable, 
the promissory disjunct operates. But there can be reverse cases. In- 
effective threats and promises may be intensified;  but if  no  amount 
of these will affect A then we do not consider him responsible. Adapt- 
ing the analysis to past responsibility, we ask whether A might have 
been so affected. When satisfied about these conditions, we want to 
say that someone we objectively judge was or is responsible. In this 
the meaning of responsibility is "completely exhausted." 
Responsibility is thus analyzed without residue in causal terms. 
Schlick assumes that reasons are causes. "We can speak of motives 
only in a causal context." "The concept of responsibility rests upon 
*–'When Is a Man Responsible?' in Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1939). pp. 141-158. Perhaps most widely reprinted in Paul  Edwards and 
Arthur Pap, A Modern Introduction  to Philosophy, 1st, 2nd and  3rd editions (New York: 
Free Press, 1957, 1965, 1973). and recently reprinted in Charles L. Reid, Basic Philosophi- 
cal Analysis (Belmont, California: Dickenson, 1971) and Paula R. and Karsten J. Struhl, 
Philosophy Now: An Introductory  Reader  (New York:  Random House, 1972). All cita- 
tions can be readily located in the original or any reprint. 
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that of causation." Since a person is a "junction of causes," the issue 
is simply whether we can further institute  a cause  that  operates 
"with certainty" to produce conduct. Human conduct is reducible to 
explanation by causal law; that is the business of ethics. "Every ex- 
planation of human behavior must ... assume the validity of causal 
laws." Determinism is assumed  true "at least to the extent required 
for all purposes of practical life in intercourse with nature and hu- 
man  beings."  To  insert  "probably"  or  "tend  to"  in  (a)   so  that 
A's action remains open, deliberative, and not in principle predictable 
vitiates Schlick's whole enterprise. 
(B) Responsibility subjectively defined. Schlick next turns to the 
conditions under which one is prepared to accept responsi- 
bility, namely, that one has "acted on one's own desires." 
What is critical is that we should freely do what we wish, 
following our "natural desires." Let us express Schlick's 
subjective analysis: 
(b) Def. suj.: A is responsible in doing x = 
A does x, and A naturally desires to do x, 
 and 
A 's natural desire to do x causes him to do x. 
The definition may be adjusted for hypothetical use when action is 
pending. 
Compulsion is the opposite of acting in such responsible freedom. 
Schlick illustrates with a  man forced  at  gunpoint  to do what  other- 
wise he would  not. The victim would not feel responsible;  nor  would 
we hold him so, but  rather  the gunman. "Compel," an  artthropomor- 
phk word, belongs in the context of  desiring  one  thing  and  being 
forced to do otherwise. Psychological laws, being natural  laws oper- 
ating through,  not  against  natural desires, do  not  compel. Civic  laws, 
a paradigm case, compel in very essence. They "often contradict the 
natural desires of the citizens ... The state does in fact compel  its 
citizens by imposing certain sanctions (punishment) which  serve  to 
bring their desires  into  harmony  with  the  prescribed  laws. Schlick 
sees the subjective analysis as a "welcoming confirmation" of the 
objective one. 
Case I 
But all this is a muddle. Consider the following case: 
(1) A naturally desires to do x. 
(2) Threat of punishment will cause A not to do x. 
(3) If threat of punishment will cause A not to do x, then, if A 
does x, A is responsible for doing x. (A is responsible should 
he do x.) 
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(4) If A does x, A is responsible for  doing x.  (A  is  responsible should 
he do x.) 
His xing is an act in which we can hold A responsible, demonstrated 
by the fact that upon threat of punishment he will not x. "Respon- 
sible for" is forward-looking; a future locution is parenthesized. Con- 
tinuing, we add: 
(5) If  threat of  punishment  will  cause A not   to  do  x, then, if  A 
does not  do x, A is  responsible for  not  doing x. (A is  respon- 
sible should he not do x.) 
(6) If A does not do x, A is responsible for not doing x. (A is 
responsible should he not do x.) 
That is, in his xing and in his not xing A is amenable to threat of 
punishment which in the former instance (4) was not applied but 
hypothesized, and in the latter (5) (as we next  suppose)  is applied 
and he answers to it. In the one case we should praise him, in  the 
other blame him; but "responsible," a double-edged word,  covers 
both. 
Now consider a further development: 
(7) C imposes on A a threat of punishment (as part of civic law) 
and thereby causes A not to do x. 
(8) If A naturally desires to do x, and if A does not do x under 
threat of punishment, then A is not responsible for not doing 
x. (A is not responsible for not having done x.) 
(9) If A does not do x, A is not responsible for not doing x. (A is 
not responsible for  not having done x.) 
Under our conditions, (9) can be read categorically: "A is not re- 
sponsible for not doing x." But we retain the hypothetical form to 
show the contrast with (6). Person A has acted under compulsion 
contrary to his natural desires. Empathizing, we concur. He was not 
responsible, he was kept upright by law. "He is hindered from with- 
out in the realization of his natural desires," says Schlick of the 
gunman's victim. But so is the subject of civic law. Schlick conflates 
many kinds of compulsion (another difficulty with his account), and 
if, as he says, legal compulsion is a paradigm case, then surely it too 
relieves moral responsibility. Law for good or revolver for ill, both 
compel. Subsequently  to  (7), "responsible for" means "responsible 
for having done," and is no longer forward-looking. But this does not 
resolve the conflict. Schlick wants us to  attribute  responsibility 
where a person is amenable to punishment. But, he says, we want to 
accept responsibility only if we act with our natural desires. 
Perhaps with a simple revision, we can yet retain Schlick's major 
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thesis. Haste at (5) and (6) generates the conflict with (9). On re- 
consideration we deny (5) and (6). In  the context  of  A's  regularly  x- 
ing in accord with his natural  desires,  it  happens  that,  under  C's 
threat, A does not x. On inquiry, the  cause of  the  exception  is  the 
novel threat. We then rather say that C, perhaps a magistrate, is re- 
sponsible for  A's not  xing. Asymmetrically, if  A x's, A is  responsible; if 
A does not x, C is. Witness the gunman and his victim. Hence, resolving 
the conflict with (9): 
(5') If  C's  threat  of  punishment  will cause  A  not  to  do  x,  then,  if 
A does not do x, C is responsible for A's not doing x. 
(6') If  A does not  do x, C is  responsible  for  A's not  doing x.  
(6") If A does not do x, A is not responsible for not doing x. 
This account would be consistent with Schlick's realization that re- 
sponsibility shifts from the compelled to the compeller. 
But by just this shift we would doubly undermine Schlick's causal 
reduction of responsibility. First, responsible action in absence of sanc- 
tions is thereby once-removed from causal laws. Since, objectively, we 
observe responsibility only to destroy it, responsibility is always hypo- 
thetical一supposed for another occasion than the one under observation. 
It  cannot  be directly verified, since no act  done under sanction is 
done responsibly; it can at best be indirectly verified, that is, sup- 
posed for earlier acts by seeing that on a subsequent  occasion, simil- 
ar in all relevant respects except that a sanction is levied, the agent 
acts differently. Curiously, it is inferred only from a condition of non- 
responsibility. So, like nonperceived objects, responsibility  only 
exists when not observed. Like a cross-wired refrigerator light, only 
on when the door is shut, responsibility is only "on" when not ob- 
jectively observed. Oddly, the necessary and sufficient condition of 
A's responsibility in his xing without sanctions is whether he might 
have been with sanctions made not responsible. Surely it is a very 
doubtful criterion of responsibility, even when acting in accord with 
one's natural desires, that one is subject to the operation of a sanc- 
tioning causal law which will operate "with certainty" to alter his 
conduct and destroy his responsibility. (We argue below, in Case II, 
that on some occasions it is rather the man who cannot be caused to 
act otherwise that we judge most responsible.) 
Secondly, and  worse, since there is no responsible  action in  the 
presence of sanctions, the revision here destroys Schlick's principal 
claim:  that responsibility is grounded in a causal relationship. Eth- 
ics, Schlick is contending, is the science of morally responsible beha- 
vior given causal explanation, enabling us to predict and alter the 
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actions of responsible men. "It is certain," he concludes, "that we can 
apply the concept of responsibility to human conduct insofar as the 
causal principle holds." Both objective and subjective analyses show 
"causality as the presupposition of responsibility," and reconcile  the 
two. But, objectively, Schlick cannot  bring moral  responsibility  un- 
der the reach of sanctioning causal law, unless he intends for us to 
accept as morally responsible actions not only those which an agent 
does in absence of sanctions but also those he does under sanctions. 
Hence (5) and (6) must be implications of  Schlick's  objective  ac- 
count (though contradicted by the subjective account), else, alas, re- 
sponsibility is exempt from precisely  the  causal law  he proposes.  If, 
in revision, Schlick were to accept (5'), (6'), and (6") to achieve con- 
sistency with his subjective account, the price would be a concession 
that responsibility is not compatible with  the operation  of  sanction- 
ing causal law, since it  vanishes when  law is exercised. So  soon as 
this law operates, it renders the previously and hypothetically re- 
sponsible agent not responsible. So far from being amenable to such 
causal law, responsibility has  quite eluded it.  Let  this law  touch it, 
and it collapses. It exists only in its absence, never in its presence. 
Persons may be supposed responsible, but no one can be held re- 
sponsible,  except  by destroying  his  responsibility and  converting  it 
to nonresponsibility. Of course, A responds, he is responsive, and, by 
straining the language, response-able, or responsible. But his respon- 
sibility is morally denatured; What is left is a shell. The moral freight 
shifts to C, the compeller. Civic laws work  only on  the  responsible, 
the "compel-able," but in their compelling work they destroy respon- 
sibility. Thus such revision of Schlick fails, since no moral respon- 
sibility in A has been included within the scope of sanctioning causal 
law. 
In an  alternate revision, we might retain Schlick's  basic condi- 
tions, yet broaden the context of  "natural desires" to make A's con- 
duct consistent with both analyses. A naturally desires to x with im­ 
punity; when that becomes impossible, then A does not x. The objec- 
tive threat works;  subjectively,  he does what, mindful  of  sanctions, 
he naturally desires. So there is no conflict. If A is a thief, this first 
seems plausible. But witness again the gunman's victim who  does 
what, situationally, he naturally desires to do. If  consistent,  we ought 
to attribute moral responsibility  to  the  victim. But  we attribute only 
an  uninteresting, denatured  responsibility.  The  moral  burden  shifts 
to the gunman. Worse than  that, if  "natural desires" includes  what 
one desires mindful of sanctions, then there can be no compulsion, 
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for one cannot act in context against his natural desires. The alter- 
nate revision proves trivial. 
When, as compellers, we show a  man  answerable to punishment, 
we do not, as Schlick would have it, show his (moral) responsibility. 
Quite the contrary, we render him nonresponsible and become respon- 
sible in his stead. 
Case II 
Contrast this now with a second case. 
(1) B naturally desires to do x. 
(2) Threat of punishment will not cause B not to do x. 
(3) If  threat of  punishment will not cause B not to do x, then, if 
B does x, B is not responsible for doing x. (B is not respons- 
ible should he do x.) 
(4) If B does x, B is not responsible for doing x. (B is not re- 
sponsible should he do x.) 
Schlick's example, a plausible one, is that of an insane person who 
commits a wrong. We do not consider him responsible, since ''he of- 
fers no unified point for the application of motive." But let us choose 
another  example. Let x  be civil disobedience contemplated  by  B, one 
of those intractable persons who cannot be intimidated by the city 
fathers. By Schlick's objective analysis, B likewise is not responsible. 
There is an autonomous natural desire to be civilly disobedient, in 
obedience (let us say) to his conscience; and no amount of threat of 
punishment· will cause him to act differently. To complete the case: 
(5) C imposes on B  a  threat of  punishment  (as part of civic law), 
but despite the threat designed to compel him not to do x, B 
nevertheless does x. 
(6) If B does x, B is responsible for doing x (for having done x), 
since he acts in accord with his natural desires, 
We must  now reverse ourselves. By Schlick's subjective analysis,  B 
is responsible. B would doubtless concur. 
Have we overlooked the promissory disjunct of definition (a)? 
Reward  the protester with relevant social action  and, unless he is in- 
deed insane, he will desist. But this solution has only prima facie 
plausibility. Other rewards, bribes, will not work. The only functional 
"reward" is a capitulation to what B desires  which  essentially  dis- 
solves the case. The "reward" does not  function  as such. Complying 
with the object of his natural desires is no longer a case of applying 
motives to B so as to  alter  the conduct  that  would  otherwise  issue 
from his natural desires. This is a very odd "reward"  that  leaves us 
asking who has altered the conduct of whom. One can analogously 
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reward a car thief so as to prevent his theft by giving him the car. 
Schlick hopes to make the case that the responsible man is the 
man both on whom and in whom causation  operates effectively, and 
to leave causation unimpaired in both cases. But, to return to person 
A, it  is  just this kind of man, who can be caused to act, that we do 
not consider responsible in the moral sense. It is open to question 
whether he has acted at all. We can manipulate him, as we can dogs 
and machines. They all respond, but not morally. Schlick's incoher- 
ence is to conclude that this compellability is moral responsibility, 
with the simultaneous admission that when causality works compel- 
lingly on us it does so with violence to the causality that works freely 
in us. 
Indeed, we often consider B most responsible precisely when he 
cannot objectively be caused  to act. Granting  his sanity, we count 
this moral responsibility, one  which,  in  favorable  cases,  we. admire 
the more because the agent cannot be manipulated. His desires ori- 
ginate within him, and he courageously and freely acts despite inti- 
midation. Since we cannot influence him, he is the author of his 
deeds; we are not. (Doubtless sometimes too, we would allow B re- 
sponsibly to desist under extreme  threat: in any event our  judgment 
of  responsibility is complex, and cannot  be reduced to  any tight  caus- 
al relation between sanctions and acts.) It is sufficient to undermine 
Schlick's account that on at Ieast some occasions B's resolute persis- 
tence in xing will confirm his responsibility, while his ready desisting 
will lessen it. Whether such responsible authorship of  one's own 
deeds involves a contracausal freedom is a very much larger issue 
than can be resolved here. Certainly  the solution, or dissolution,  is 
not nearly so simple as Schlick has proposed. Meanwhile, his hope of 
retaining responsibility under ethics as an applied science has col- 
lapsed. 
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